Brian Hedden
Professor
School of Philosophy
Australian National University
brian.hedden@gmail.com
About
I am a Professor of Philosophy at ANU.
Previously, I was a junior research fellow at Oxford and then a Senior Lecturer at the University of Sydney.
I earned my A.B. from Princeton and my PhD from MIT.
I work in epistemology and decision theory, as well as related areas of ethics and political philosophy.
Papers (click for preprints)
2024
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109(2): 575-92
2024
"Multidimensional Concepts and Disparate Scale Types"
(with Jacob M. Nebel)
The Philosophical Review 133(3): 265-308
2024
(with Justin D'Ambrosio)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(2): 253-77
2024
2023
"Counterfactual Decision Theory"
Mind 132 (527): 730-61.
(Nominated for Inclusion in the 2023 Philosopher's Annual)
2022
"(Almost) All Evidence is Higher-Order Evidence"
(with Kevin Dorst)
Analysis 82(3): 417-25
(Nominated for Inclusion in the 2022 Philosopher's Annual)
2021
"On Statistical Criteria of Algorithmic Fairness"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.
(Winner of the inaugural APA AI2050 Early Career Researcher Prize)
2020
"Consequentialism and Collective Action"
Ethics, 130 (4):530-554.
2019
"Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.
2019
"Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defense"
(with Mark Colyvan)
Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (4):448-468.
2019
"Rationality and Synchronic Identity"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):544-558.
2019
"Hindsight Bias is not a Bias"
Analysis 79 (1):43-52.
2017
"Summary" and "Reply to Critics"
For a symposium on Reasons without Persons.
Analysis 77 (3): 569-571 and 607-618.
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2017
Social Epistemology 31 (4):368-386.
2016
2016
"Mental Processes and Synchronicity"
Mind 125 (499):873-888.
2016
2016
"Does MITE Make Right?: Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty"
Oxford Studies in Metaethics vol 11: 102-128
2015
"A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.
2015
"Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief"
Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.
2015
Mind 124 (494):449-491.
2015
"Options and Diachronic Tragedy"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.
2013
"Incoherence without Exploitability"
Noûs 47 (3):482-495.
2012
"Options and the Subjective Ought"
Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
Book Chapters
forthcoming
"Transitivity, Majority Rule, and the Repugnant Conclusion"
In Conditionals, Probability and Decision: Essays in Honour of Alan Hájek, ed. Branden Fitelson, JJ Joaquin, and Weng Hong. Springer.
2022
"Individual Time-Bias and Social Discounting"
In Time in Action, ed. Carla Bagnoli, Routledge
2021
"Introduction to Part II: Rationality and Time"
In Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry, ed. Andrea Sauchelli, Routledge
Book Reviews
2020
"Review of Meghan Sullivan, Time Biases"
Philosophical Review 129(3): 495-499
2019
"Review of McHugh, Way, and Whiting (eds), Metaepistemology"
Notre Dame Philosophical Review